Globalization: the Americanization of the World?

Andrew J. Bacevich, the Statesn Empire The Realities and Consequences of U. S. Diplomacy (Harvard University Press, 2002). Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (Norton, 2007). throng L. Watson, ed. , Golden Arches East McDonalds in East Asia (2nd edition, Stanford University Press, 2007). Robert McCrum, Globish How the English Language Became the Worlds Language (Norton, 2010). F beed Zakaria, The Post-the Statesn World (Norton, 2009). Globalization is the integration of the worlds different regions into a global culture, economy, geo- governmental arena, and communication ne twork.It is the process by which the lines of nation states are blurred, smoothed over by immature inter issue institutions. Globalization is the inevit commensurate destination of human history and as such permeates nearly every facet of it. It is liquid in this sense, flowing and changing to fill in wheresoever it flows, entirely there stool be no doubts of the tide of globalisations source The join States of the States. At first glance, the distinctions between Globalization and Americanization are almost imperceptible. well-favoured Mac, Coke, and Disney (Watson, 5) are as recognizable to Chinese and Russians as they are to Americans.The World Bank and IMFs policies are more(prenominal) or little set by Washington. The American military has the most stiff armies and fleets the world has ever seen, and has effectively dominated the world from World War I onwards. The unify States population which is less than 5% of the world population produces approximately a quarter of global gross domestic product. Such realities top executive lead one to the conclusion that Globalization and Americanization are synonymous, besides is this actually the case? In the discussion of the books at hand, globalisation as it pertains to Americanization is made evident.Andrew Bacevich contends that the unite States is the primary agent of forward-looking globalization. It has capital ized on the opportunities it has been presented with in nightspot to create a system of global politics and economics that is of the most bene volley to itself, all the while packaging it in altruistic rhetoric. Joseph Stiglitz contends that the United States has conducted globalization by dominating the institutions of world governance and finance. It has dresse so to the detriment of other(a) nations and as such, the American means of globalization is not the best strategy if true globalization is the desired end. James Watson holds that McDonalds, once as iconic of America as the stars and stripes and one of the leading agents of globalization, has been assimilated into many local cultures. As such, it no longer represents the modifyd aspect of globalization, however is rather an inter field institution and an agent of globalization at large. Yet, some of the seemingly obvious aspects of American conduct globalization are not as American as they may seem today.Robert McCru m offers that English being the worlds language a plagiarizes not from American economic and foreign policies, but is rather a legacy of the British Empire. Furthermore, that America is not spreading its culture through English, it is only a rotating shaft to be used for communication. Finally, Fareed Zakaria demonstrates that we are departing from a unipolar world dominated by America. Although it will continue to play a leading role in the globalization of the world, the rise of the rest is diminishing its role and the United States is no longer solely holding the reins of globalization.Andrew Bacevichs assertion is that the idea of the American pudding stone differs only in form from traditional imperialism. Its function, enriching the mother country, is precisely the same but employs a variety of techniques to guess this less evident. The United States embraces its role in history of exerting power only as a last resort. Only when circumstances totally necessitated it would America resort to using Theodore Roosevelts proverbial orotund stick (Bacevich 117).The Spanish American war began only when General Valeriano Butcher Weyler could be tolerated no more. World War I was entered only because of the unprovoked German aggression upon the Lusitania. Cold War military and political endeavors were nobly pursued to defend against Communist aggression. Yet Andrew Bacevich rejects this view. He argues that this myth of the slow superpowerAmericans assert themselves only under duress and then al manners for the noblest purposes (Bacevich 7-8) is exactly that, a myth.That Roosevelts reportedly soft speaking and big stick carrying America uses the reluctant superpower myth only in order to justify acts of self-interest. Perhaps the more fitting description of America by Theodore Roosevelt is his affirmation that of course, our whole national history has been one of expansion (Bacevich, 7). The United States has conscientiously exerted itself at every opportuni ty in order to expand its global economic and strategic interests. Americas superpower status and role as an agent of globalization is driven entirely by the machinery of self-interest.Bacevich writes that ever increasing prosperity (Bacevich, 85) is the primary national interest. Furthermore, as Bill Clinton stated Growth at home depends upon growth abroad. Of course, there is still the legitimate idealistic side of globalization as the last promise of peace, prosperity, and democracy (Bacevich, 42), but Americas actual interest and role in globalization is to expand the American economy. In other words, Americas aims in globalization are to benefit the world yes, but benefit the United States most of all (Bacevich, 96).The American economic empire, brought about by the domestic desire for continued growth is the overarching American interest in the realm of globalization. The item that where interests were slight, the United States seldom bothered to make the effort to assert a ny substantial leverage (Bacevich, 107) vividly illustrates this. Considering the insubstantial economic incentives of Africa, it consistently ranks dead last in U. S. strategic priorities (Bacevich, 107). Now, take into account the economic and political incentives of Europes markets and the Middle Easts oil reserves.Based on US military intervention, it is telling that conditions that in the Balkans or the Persian disconnectedness the United States found intolerable were in Africa only unfortunate (Bacevich, 108). The United States found it necessary to militarily intervene in the former two interest-rife locations, and merely sent aid and rhetorical sympathies to the economically barren latter. The portrait of Americanization and Globalization that Andrew Bacevich paints acknowledges one of the primary facets upon which the two collide, the global economy and the United States role indoors it.To deny that America has been the driving force behind the creation and continuance o f modern open market operations, and to deny that it has done so for the betterment of its consume economic interests is to deny all but the rhetoric of American imperialism. The United States did not have, as the historian Ernest May naively stated, greatness thrust upon it (Bacevich, 7), but rather calculatedly and ingeniously shaped its responses to global politics and economics in order to integrate and derive the most benefit from the new globalized economy.Joseph Stiglitz, rather explicitly argues that globalization should not mean the Americanization of either economic policy or culture, but it often doesand that has caused resentment (Stiglitz, 9). He argues that the worry about American unilateralism, about the worlds most powerful country imposing its will on others (Stiglitz, 5) is fast becoming substantiated. Despite economic indicators such as GDP suggesting that poor countries seem to be improving, globalization might be creating rich countries with poor people (Stigl itz, 9).As Stiglitz argues, the United States goal of making Americanization a grammatical constituent of globalization is causing this. Particularly responsible has been the Washington Consensus, a set of development promoting policies created between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the U. S. Treasury. The former two of these are basically international lending bodies, delivering short and long term loans, respectively, to countries in need.The policies outlined are downscaling of government, deregulation, and rapid liberalization and privatization (Stiglitz, 17). Although these are the characteristics of westbound countries, western countries did not become this way through the shock therapy of instant implementation. quite an they came from a drawn out progression of events The implication is that the United States, in attempting to make its political and economic policies integral concepts of the grander one of globalization, is actually turning cou ntries off to the Americanized aspect of globalization.Similarly, the manner in which the United States encourages international trade to be conducted is a hindrance to globalization at large within poor countries. Stiglitz writes that countries often need time to develop in order to compete with foreign companies (Stiglitz, 70). Yet, The United States and the international trade organizations which it dominates oppose tariffs for many industries on the grounds of it inhibiting trade and not allowing the all-wise power of the market to control the economy.However, most successful countries did in fact develop behind protectionist barriers and climbed the ladder of development. The anti-tariff policies that soundly developed countries advocate are viewed as trying to kick the ladder away so others cant follow (Stiglitz, 71). The uncertain effectiveness of these western policies, policies necessary for developing countries to get assistance from the IMF and World Bank, which they almo st undeniably need, calls into question the western policies which they dont necessarily need, namely democracy.Stiglitz writes that IMF conditionality undermines democracy (Stiglitz, 56), that although globalization has helped spread the idea of democracy, it has, paradoxically, been managed in a way that undermines democratic processes within countries (Stiglitz, 12). America, in efforts to save countries from disbursal time on the economic policy learning curve, in reality ends up harming them. As such, the United States inadequacy for creating economic agendas for developing countries is a paradox of its own success.He posits that in order for the developing countries to benefit from globalization, the agenda of globalization needs to depart from the Americanized version, and instead have the voices of developing nations (be) heard more clearly (Stiglitz, 98). If the hardline factors of globalizationeconomics, geo-political military assertions, and international governance are the easiest to assess the American-ness ofthe soft aspects cultural and linguistic patterns, are the most difficult.James Watson contends that in some respect, global corporations gain their transnational appeal simply by being American by being an image of modernity. However, he to a fault holds that components of globalization that were once considered agents of Americanization are now accepted as local. Japanese McDonalds have clearly capitalized on the fact that it is associated with American culture (Watson, 172). In China, McDonalds promotes the corporations image as an exemplar of modernity (Watson, 42).McDonalds in these countries represents what the West represents, or more accurately, what the locals believe the West to representthe promise of modernization (Watson, 41). It has asleep(p) so far as to even change cultural eating habits. In these locations, McDonalds sells more than hamburgers. It sells America as an ideology, a place of modernity, cleanliness, efficiency, and equality. As Watson would contend in China and Japan, McDonalds represents the convergence of the idealistic facets of Americanization and globalization the United States as a favorable model to be emulated.Yet in the case of McDonalds in Hong Kong, it is not considered an example of American-inspired transnational culture or perceived as an exotic or alien institution (Watson, 107). Rather it is a fully assimilated part of Hong Kongs modern culture. As Watson writes, the transnational is the local. The younger generation could not imagine life without it (Watson, 109). Thusly, at least in Hong Kong, the American aspect of McDonalds globalization has faded with its assimilation into the national identity element. Although American, it no longer Americanizes or suggests that the American odel is something good and unique that should be followed. McDonalds in Korea however suggests a different view of Americanization. Some people hold that eating McDonalds hamburgers is tantamo unt to treason and loss of Korean identity (Watson, 158) At least here, to some degree McDonalds is viewed as an American crusader of cultural imperialisma new form of exploitation that results from the export of hot culture from the United States (Watson, 5). McDonalds represents a conquering American agent seeking to enthrall and draw in cultures to that of its global Americanized one.Another phenomenon of globalization, one might argue American-driven globalization, is English becoming the language of the world. Robert McCrum argues however that this is not a legacy of the American century, but rather a legacy of the British Empire. America has helped to propagate it but it in fact is originally an agent of British-ization. McCrum writes The nineteenth (century) was, supremely, the century of British English first the Kings and then the tabbys but it alike witnessed the beginnings of the worlds English (McCrum, 174).English spread to the earth not as a result of Americas dom inance in the 20th century, but rather Britains far flung immigration in the 19th. McCrum contends that this is what made Jean-Paul Nerrieres global English (Globish) so neighborly to so many people across the world. It is removed from American influence in that it was not asserted upon the world by America. Rather because of Britain and certain historical tilts towards English speaking, it simply fell into place.In essence, McCrum asserts that British English lay the foundation for English to become, as John Adams wrote in 1780, in the next and win centuriesthe language of the world (McCrum, 105), and as such is not truly an assertion of American influence. However, McCrums points are debatable. As a proud Englishman, he seems alert to assert the obvious role of Britain in making it a global language, but is less generous when it comes to the American aspects. Furthermore, his denial of English as a cultural force is problematic. The global media is dominated by America.The lar gest media conglomerates in the world are American. Ten of the highest twelve paid musicians in the world are American. McCrum seems to veer the fact that media is one of the largest aspects of globalization, and that American influences dominate it. These have been the themes of globalization. The convergence of Americanization and globalization has dually permeated military affairs, economics, culture, and language. On the global stage, the United States has been the dominant player for over a century. However, to what extent will this remain true in the 21st century?Fareed Zakaria contends that it will, but will consider a reassessment of the global community. Zakaria puts forth that we are now living through the third great power shift of the modern era (Zakaria, 2), not the decline of America but ratherthe rise of everyone else (Zakaria, 1). What this means for Globalization as it is linked to Americanization is that although the U. S. s role will still be there, it is dimini shing. The historically United States dominated past has paved the way for this. Its active efforts in globalizing the worlds consequence is the rise of the rest (Zakaria, 2).As Zakaria writes the United States succeeded in its great and historic missionit globalized the world. But along the wayit forgot to globalize itself (Zakaria, 48). The arising international order that Zakaria sees is a term invented by Samuel Huntington uni-multipolarity, which can be described as many powers and one super-power (Zakaria, 43). In the new international order, the United States will merely be a leading actor on a stage of many. The other actors are comprised of new powerful economiesChina, India, Brazil.The United States has been able to maintain its preeminence within globalization in the past but the changing realities of the global economic landscape will require according change from America. Zakaria lays out a series of principles that the United States should or must follow in order to ma intain its position in the modern world as a chief agent of globalization. These principles recognize the changing landscape and suggest how America can perpetuate its interests, its goal of Americanization within globalization. Firstly, the United States must choose which policies it actively wants to pursue.The ambiguity of policy facing Iran and North Korea do not allow the United States to reach an attainable international goal. If the United States were to decide that they were simply proponents of regime change or policy change (that is, denuclearization) (Zakaria, 234) they could more efficiently define the changes they wish to see in the global community. Similarly, in order for the US to continue to blend Americanization with Globalization, they must set out broad rules and seek to cultivate its bilateral relationships with other nations.As Zakaria argues, if the U. S. has strong relationships with other strong nations, better than anyone has with another, it gives the Unit ed States the greatest leveragemaximizing its ability to shape a peaceful and stable world (Zakaria, 242). The United States must also be careful in how it shapes its responses to international conflict. Legitimacy is power (Zakaria, 247) and the nature of the United States current conflicts are asymmetrical, meaning they are not facing conventional military forces or typical state actors.As Zakaria writes asymmetrical responses have become easier to execute and difficult to defeat (Zakaria, 244). Therefore in order to remain legitimate, to have the power to set the agenda, define a crisis, and mobilize support (Zakaria, 247) for the United States interests in globalization, reactions need to be shaped to fit the conflicts at hand. Overall, Zakaria contends that if the United States is not willing to change its policies and approach towards globalization and the global community, it will no longer effectively be able to appointment Americanization with globalization.In the analysis of how linked globalization and Americanization are within the context of these books, a complex and comprehensive picture can be draw. The United States has been able to use globalization as a tool to create a global economic empire and cultural model. Through the capitalization of opportunities to expand its markets, package in its reluctant superpower myth, the United States has been able to assert itself internationally and accomplish its political and economic aims.However, the changing nature of the global landscape calls for a recalculation of how this strategy of self-interest can be perpetuated. Furthermore, the United States will have to make some concessions regarding its hegemony as other nations with large populations and strong economies grow in power and importance. Culturally, the United States benefited from the British Empires legacy of spreading English around the world. However, it has also been able to capitalize on this and further Americanize the world throu gh the consequentially large English speaking media outlets.Multinational corporations such as McDonalds still possess their American identity abroad, but this is beginning to change in respect to the worlds youth. It is now dually perceived as a symbol of modernity (which sometimes equates to Americanization) but also a component of local culture. Therefore, whether globalization is the Americanization of the world seems to be a yes. The debate whether it will, or should continue to be, is still ongoing, and remains to be seen, dependent on how America conducts itself in the post-American World.